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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Atmospheric Revitalization
Pressure Control Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Mode ahd Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
(FMEA/CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a-_roach features a _- o_n analysis of the-h-_-{dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent
analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric
Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS).
The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following
subdivisions:
o Atmospheric Make-up and Control
oo Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly
oo Oxygen Assembly
oo Nitrogen Assembly
o Atmospheric Vent and Control
oo Positive Relief Vent Assembly
oo Negative Relief Vent Assembly
oo Cabin Vent Assembly
The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware draw-
ings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components,
and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the six major assemblies of the ARPCS. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number 281111211RI2121311R592 2 3/2R32 3/3 I TOTAL121 266
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/1 I 2/1R 2/2
Number : 28 59 2
3/IR
3/2RI_ TOTAL89
wmm+
2
I I I
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Figure 1 - ARPCS ANALYSIS SUMMARY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of ti_e Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Cont:cactor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that will
be performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 ARPCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The general ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.2. The ARPCS specific ground rules and
assumptions are presented in Appendix B.3.
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3.0 13UBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The ARPCS provides shirt-sleeve environment for the crew by
pres:_urizing the cabin to 14.7 psia with approximately 21% oxygen
and 79% nitrogen. Cabin pressure can also be maintained at 8.0
psia for emergency (cabin leak) condition.
For the purpose of this study, the ARPCS was divided into two
sections and six assemblies as shown in Figure 2 for which a
brief discussion is provided below:
Ao Atmospheric Make-up and Control (AMC) - This section uses
cryogenic oxygen and gaseous nitrogen for cabin pressure
maintenance and crew metabolic requirements. The AMC also
provides oxygen or nitrogen for EMU/MMU recharges, water
tanks pressurization, payload requirements, and
cabin/airlock repressurizations. Figure 3 presents an over-
view of the AMC and its major hardware components.
This section is further divided into the following three
assemblies:
I • Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly - This assembly provides
gaseous oxygen (approximately 50 ibm) to the
emergency breathing station under emergency conditions
and absence of cryogenic oxygen• This assembly
consists of one tank, a 300 psi regulator, a motorized
valve, and an isolation valve. The assembly interfaces
with the oxygen assembly at the crossover manifold and
emergency breathing station as shown in Figure 4.
This assembly is only installed on vehicle OVl02 as a
mission kit, and has not been removed.
• Oxygen Assembly - The oxygen assembly uses oxygen from
the cryogenic oxygen tanks and conditions it for
distribution through emergency breathing station, and
14.7 psia cabin regulators. It also provides oxygen
for EMU recharges, and spacelab habitable module
requirements.
The emergency breathing station regulates and delivers
the oxygen to Launch and Entry Helmets (LEHs) during
nominal ascent/entry phase, and continuously to LEH-5
during the on-orblt phase. Under cabin leak
conditions, this station will also deliver direct
(unregulated) cryogenic oxygen to the cabin through
direct bleed orifice•
The oxygen is nominally provided to the cabin through
either of two redundant loops. Oxygen from the
cryogenic tanks is warmed to gaseous state and reduced
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to I00 psig before delivery to 02/N2 control panel.
The panel delivers i00 psig oxygen to the 14.7 psia
cabin regulator, and subsequently into the cabin for
pressure maintenance and crew usage. This oxygen
interfaces with the 200 psig nitrogen on the panel
before entering the cabin regulator.
The oxygen in the cabin is controlled either automati-
cally by one of two controllers, or manually by the
crew. In the Auto mode, the controllers sense the
partial pressure of oxygen in the cabin. If the PP02
is below 3.2 +/- 0.2 psia, the controllers will close
the 02/N2 control valve allowing 100 psig oxygen to
flow to the 14.7 psia cabin regulators. Otherwise, the
02/N2 control valve will be open allowing 200 psig
nitrogen to flow to the cabin regulator, thus prevent-
ing i00 psig oxygen to flow. In the manual mode, this
operation is done by the crew based on continous
monitoring of the cabin total pressure and partial
pressure of oxygen.
• Nitrogen Assembly - The nitrogen assembly stores
gaseous nitrogen in four supply tanks, and uses it for
cabin pressure maintenance, MMU recharges, payload
requirements, and supply/waste water tanks
pressurization.
The nitrogen tanks are loaded prelaunch storing
approximately 262 ibm of nitrogen. Tanks 1 and 2, and
Tanks 3 and 4 are manifolded together and referred to
as System 1 and System 2, respectively• System 1 and
System 2 are operated interchangeably through two
dedicated nitrogen loops with identical sets of
hardware• Capability is provided for a cross-tie
operation of the loops.
The nitrogen from the supply tanks are regulated to
200+/-15 psig before flowing to the 14.7 psia cabin
regulator, payload, and water tanks. Nitrogen require-
ment for MMU recharges is taken upstream of the 200
psig regulation. The cabin pressure maintenance is
provided by the 02/N2 control panel through combined
operation of the 14.7 psia cabin regulator and 02/N2
control valve. -The 200 psig nitrogen interfaces with
i00 psig oxygen downstream of 02/N2 control valve
before entering the cabin regulator as discussed in the
oxygen assembly section.
So Atmospheric Vent and Control (AVC) - The AVC provides
capability to maintain cabin structural integrity under
excessive positive or negative pressure gradients. It will
also provide capability for rapid cabin depressurization and
prelaunch checkout.
This section is further divided into the following three
assemblies as shown by Figure 5:
l • Positive Relief Vent - The positive relief vent is
comprised of two separate and redundant loops which
provides capability to vent cabin atmosphere under high
(16 psia) cabin pressure. Each loop consists of a
motorized valve, and a relief valve. The motorized
valves are used to isolate the assembly.
• Negative Relief Vent - The negative relief vent is
comprised of dual redundant lines with self-operating
relief valves (one per loop). The relief valves will
permit atmospheric air into the cabin when outside
pressure rises 0.2 psia above cabin pressure.
• Cabin Vent - The cabin vent is comprised of two
identical motor driven valves which provide capability
to rapidly vent and check crew cabin pressure during
prelaunch operations. The vent valves are denied power
after liftoff (circuit breakers are pulled) to prevent
inadvertent decompression of the cabin.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The 2_PCS hardware is primarily divided between the mid-fuselage
and crew module. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show an overall representa-
tion and location of these equipment.
The _PCS interfaces were established and studied to assess their
performace impact due to failure modes. The subsytem interfaces
were:
A. PRSD - The ARPCS receives cryogenic oxygen from The Power
Reactant, Supply, and Distribution Subsystem at high
pressure (800 to 850 psia) and low temperature (-280 F to
-220 F) for general usage.
B• ATCS - The Active Thermal Control Subsystem provides heat
for thermal conditioning of the cryogenic oxygen to gaseous
oxygen through restrictors.
Co ECLSS - The ARPCS interfaces with the Environmental Control
and Life Support Subsystem by providing oxygen/nitrogen for
airlock support activities, and supply/waste water tanks
pressurization•
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Payload - payload interfaces are accomplished through
oxygen/nitrogen ports for EMU/MMU recharges and spacelab
pressurization.
EPS - The Electrical Power Subsystem provides bus power to
drive electrical components, switches, display, and instru-
mentation throughout the ARPCS subsytem.
ARS - The gaseous oxygen and nitrogen are provided to the
Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem for circulation
throughout the crew cabin.
3.3 Hierarchy
For the purpose and ease of this analysis, the ARPCS was divided
into two main sections and six assemblies as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 - ARPCS BREAKDOWN
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Figure 3 - ATMOSPHERIC MAKE-UP AND CONTROL
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Figure 4 - AUXILIARY OXYGEN ASSEMBLY
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Figure 5 - ATMOSPHERIC VENT AND CONTROL
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the six major assemblies of
the ARPCS.
TABLEI SUMMARYOF IOA FAILUREMODESAND CRITICALITIES
Criticality I i/x 12/_RI2/2 I 3/_RI 3/2RI 3/3 ITOTAL
Auxiliary Oxygen
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Pos. Relief Vent
Neg. Relief Vent
Cabin vent
15
6
7
g
m
25
24
5
4
1
m
m
2
l0
14
10
18
4
J
2O
26
53
7
2
13
35
77
118
16
6
14m I
TOTAL 1281591 21 2_ I 32 11211266
Of the 266 failure modes studied, 89 were determined to be
Potential Critical Items (PCIs). A summary of PCIs is presented
in Table II and Appendix D presents an itemized listing of these
PCIs. No PCI was identified due to a failure to pass any of
the redundancy screens. Further discussion of these PCIs is
provided in the following subsections.
TABLE II SUMMARY OF I0A POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
Criticality I 1/1 I 2/1R I 2/2 I 3/IR I 3/2R ITOTAL
Auxiliary Oxygen
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Pos. Relief Vent
Nego Relief Vent
Cabin vent
15
6
7
m
u
25
24
5
4
1
m
2
m
n
m
15
31
33
5
4
1
TOTAL 1281591 21- I- 189
Table III presents a comprehensive listing of the ARPCS hardware
items and their associated crlticalities. This table may be used
for cross referencing to the detailed analysis results in Appendix C,
14
In addition to these items, the associated signal conditioners
and MDMswere analyzed to determine their failure modes and
impact on the subsystem. The results of this study were
submitted to the Instrumentation Subsystem for an overall failure
mode analysis.
4.1 Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly
The PCIs in this assembly are primarily due to failures which
resulted in loss of oxygen flow to the crew through LEH panels.
These were predicated upon the auxiliary oxygen usage under
emergency condition (cabin leak) and absence of cryogenic oxygen
supply. These PCIs are of 1/l category, and account for 54% of
i/1 criticality failure modes in the subsystem.
Typical failure modes resulting in such a criticalities are
associated with valves failed closed, external leakage, or tank
rupture caused by shock, vibration, or fatigue.
4.2 Oxygen Assembly
The I/i and 2/1R PCIs noted for the oxygen assembly were derived
based upon associated component failures which resulted in either
loss of oxygen to the crew, or creating oxygen rich cabin. The
loss of oxygen to the crew was obviously considered to be life
threatening, and the oxygen rich cabin created hazardous
condition for fire.
4.3 Nitrogen Assembly
The i/l, 2/1R, and 2/2 PCIs were primarily due to failures which
resulted in loss of nitrogen to maintain cabin pressure. Loss of
nitrogen in some cases also resulted in compartment overpressuri-
zation (due to leak) which was considered potential for
structural failure. Furthermore, depletion of consumable nitrogen
was considered in these cases to cause loss of pressure
maintenance capability to successfully complete a mission.
Finally, in one instance (failed closed O2/N2 control valve), the
PCIs was due to loss of nitrogen flow control into the cabin
resulting in an eventual oxygen rich cabin.
4.4 Positive Relief Valve Assembly
Five 2/IR PCIs were noted in this assembly due to component
failures (vent valves failed closed) which resulted in loss of
capability to vent cabin atmosphere under severe positive
pressure gradient. This was considered to create a potential for
structural failure of the cabin. Also, the PCIs include
failures (vent valve failed open) which if not corrected will
result in cabin decompression, thus a life threatening condition.
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4.5 Negative Relief Valve Assembly
Four 2/IR PCIs were derived based upon failure modes (vent valve
failed closed) which resulted in loss of capability to safeguard
cabin structure from excessive negative pressure gradient. This
was considered to be a condition for potential structural
failure. Also, failures (vent valve failed open) which result in
cabin decompression were considered and included.
4.6 Cabin vent Assembly
Only one PCI (2/1R) was identified which is due to failure of
either vent valve or vent isolation valve in open position. The
failure of one of these valves will result in a condition that is
one step away from loss of life/vehicle, and a life threatening
condition with the failure of the second associated valve.
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT
101 3/3 3/3
102 3/3 3/3
* 103 1/1 1/1
* 104 1/1 1/1
105 3/3 3/3
106 3/3 3/3
* 107 i/i i/i
* 108 i/i i/i
109 3/3 3/3
ii0 3/3 3/3
ill 3/3 3/3
* i12 i/i i/i
113 3/3 3/3
* 114 i/i I/I
115 3/3 3/3
i16 3/3 3/3
117 3/3 3/3
i18 3/3 3/3
* 119 i/i i/i
120 3/3 /NA
121 3/3 3/3
122 3/3 /NA
123 3/3 /NA
124 3/3 /NA
* 125 i/i i/i
126 3/3 3/3
* 127 i/I 1/l
* 128 i/i I/i
* 129 i/I i/i
130 3/3 3/3
* 131 1/l i/i
132 3/3 3/3
* 133 I/i 1/l
* 134 1/l i/I
* 135 i/I i/i
136 3/3 3/3
137 3/3 3/3
* 138 2/IR 2/1R
* 139 2/IR 2/IR
140 3/3 3/3
* 141 2/IR 2/IR
142 3/3 3/3
* 143 2/IR 2/IR
ITEM
AUXILIARY OXYGEN ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SENSOR-V61P2166A(1)
TEMPERATURE SENSOR- V61T2216A(1)
AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (1)
AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (i)
PRESSURE SENSOR-V61P2161A (i)
SUPPLY VALVE-LVS(1)
SUPPLY VALVE-LV5(1)
SUPPLY VALVE-LV5(1)
POSITION INDICATION, DS8 (I)
DIODE, DS8 (2)
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (i)
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (i)
SWITCH-S12
SWITCH-S12
RESISTOR, A9R2, 5.1K (i)
RESISTOR, AgR2, 5.1K (I)
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI6
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI6
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (i)
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (i)
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (I)
FILTER, l0 MICRONS (i)
FILTER, I0 MICRONS (i)
CAP/GSE DISCONNECT
CAP/GSE DISCONNECT
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
ISOLATION VALVE (i)
ISOLATION VALVE (1)
ISOLATION VALVE (1)
LINES AND FITTINGS
OXYGEN ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SENSOR-V64P0202A(1)
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
SWITCH-S15 AND SI8 (2)
RESISTOR-AI2RI & R2/5.1K (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI9 & CB20 (2)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCSHARDWAREITEMS, CONTINUED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
144 3/3 3/3
* 145 2/IR 2/IR
146 3/3 3/3
* 147 2/1R 2/1R
148 3/IR 3/IR
* 149 2/IR 2/1R
* 150 2/IR 2/IR
151 3/3 3/3
* 152 2/IR 2/IR
* 153 2/IR 2/IR
* 154 2/IR 2/IR
* 155 2/IR 2/IR
* 156 2/IR 2/IR
* 157 2/IR 2/IR
158 3/3 3/3
* 159 2/IR 2/IR
160 3/3 3/3
161 3/3 3/3
* 162 2/IR 2/IR
163 3/3 3/3
* 164 1/l i/I
* 165 i/i i/I
* 166 I/i i/i
167 3/3 3/3
* 168 i/i i/i
169 3/3 3/3
170 3/3 /NA
* 171 i/i /NA
172 3/3 /NA
173 3/3 3/3
* 174 i/i i/i
* 175 2/IR 2/IR
* 176 2/IR 2/IR
* 177 2/IR 2/IR
178 3/3 3/3
* 179 2/IR 2/IR
180 3/2R 3/2R
181 3/3 3/3
182 3/3 3/3
183 3/3 3/3
184 3/3 3/3
185 3/2R 3/3
* 186 2/IR 2/IR
187 3/IR 3/3
188 3/2R 3/3
OXYGEN ASSEMBLY, CONTINUED
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI9 & CB20 (2)
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
ORIFICE- LOOPI&2 (3)
ORIFICE- LOOPI&2 (3)
ORIFICE- LOOPI&2 (3)
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEH 02 REGULATOR (2)
LEH 02 REGULATOR (2)
LEG 02 REGULATOR (2)
RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)
RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
CHECK VALVE
CHECK VALVE
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW (8)
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW (8)
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW (8)
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
CAP/LEH Q.DSCNT (8)
SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (i)
SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (i)
ORIFICE-DIRECT BLEED (i)
FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
FLOW SENSOR MTII&MTI2 (2)
SWITCH-02 FLOW,S5 (i)
C&W-O2/N2 FLOW (1)
PRESSURE SENSOR, REG INLET-MT3&4
REGULATOR INLET SOY (2)
REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)
REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)
REGULATOR - i00 PSIG (2)
REGULATOR - i00 PSIG (2)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS, CONTINUED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
* 189 2/IR 2/IR
190 3/IR 3/3
191 3/2R 3/3
192 3/3 3/3
193 3/3 3/3
194 3/2R 3/3
195 3/IR 3/IR
196 3/IR 3/IR
197 3/3 3/3
198 3/IR 3/IR
199 3/3 3/3
200 3/2R 3/2R
201 3/1R 3/1R
202 3/2R 3/2R
203 3/1R 3/1R
204 3/3 3/3
205 3/1R 3/1R
206 3/2R 3/3
* 207 2/1R 3/2R
* 208 2/1R 3/3
209 3/2R 3/3
* 210 2/1R 2/1R
211 3/1R 3/1R
* 212 2/IR 2/1R
213 3/3 3/3
* 214 i/i i/I
215 3/3 /NA
* 216 i/I i/i
217 3/3 /NA
* 218 1/1 1/1
219 3/3 /NA
220 3/3 /NA
221 3/3 3/3
222 3/2R 3/3
223 3/2R 3/3
* 224 2/1R 2/1R
225 3/3 3/3
226 3/3 3/3
227 3/3 3/3
228 3/2R 3/3
229 3/2R 3/3
230 3/2R 3/3
231 3/3 3/3
OXYGEN ASSEMBLY, CONTINUED
REGULATOR - 100 PSIG (2)
RELIEF VALVE, 245 PSIG (2)
RELIEF VALVE, 245 PSIG (2)
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
CHECK VALVE (2)
CHECK VALVE (2)
CHECK VALVE (2)
LINES & FITTINGS
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
ORIFICE (2)
ORIFICE (2)
PRESSURE SENSOR, MT7 & MT8 (2)
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
14.7 PSI REGULATOR
14.7 PSI REGULATOR (2)
8 PSI REGULATOR (2)
8 PSI REGULATOR (2)
NITROGEN ASSEMBLY
N2 TANKS (4)
TEMPERATURE SENSOR (4)
LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28
GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (1)
GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (1)
GSE CAP (i)
GSE CAP (1)
GSE FILTER (1)-10 MICRONS
GSE FILTER (1)-10 MICRONS
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
POSITION INDICATION, DS8&DS9 (2)
DIODE, DS8&DS9 (4)
RESISTOR, DS8&S9,5.1K (4)
SWITCH-SI0&SII, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
SWITCH-SI0&SlI, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER 69&74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER 69&74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS, CONTINUED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
* 232 2/IR 3/3
233 3/3 3/3
* 234 2/IR 2/IR
* 235 2/IR 2/IR
236 3/3 3/3
* 237 2/IR 2/IR
238 3/3 3/3
239 3/3 3/3
240 3/2R 3/3
* 241 2/IR 3/3
242 3/3 3/3
243 3/3 3/3
244 3/3 3/3
245 3/3 3/3
* 246 2/IR 2/IR
* 247 2/IR 2/IR
248 3/3 /NA
249 3/3 3/3
250 3/3 3/3
251 3/3 3/3
252 3/3 3/3
* 253 2/IR 2/IR
254 3/3 3/3
255 3/3 3/3
256 3/3 3/3
* 257 2/IR 2/IR
* 258 2/IR 2/IR
* 259 2/IR 2/IR
260 3/3 3/3
* 261 2/IR 2/1R
* 262 2/IR 2/IR
* 263 i/I i/I
264 3/3 3/3
* 265 2/IR 2/IR
* 266 2/IR 2/IR
267 3/2R 3/2R
268 3/3 3/3
269 3/2R 3/2R
270 3/2R 3/3
* 271 2/IR 2/IR
272 3/2R 3/3
* 273 2/IR 2/IR
274 3/3 3/3
275 3/3 3/3
* 276 i/I i/i
NITROGEN ASSEMBLY, CONTINUED
LINES & FITTINGS
N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
MOTOR/N2 SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
MOTOR/N2 SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
POSITION INDICATION, DS6&DSI0 (2)
DIODE, DS6&DSI0 (4)
SWITCH, Sl3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7& CB18 (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7& CBI8 (2)
RESISTOR AIORI&AI7RI(5.1K) (2)
REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2 (2)
REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVI & LV2 (2)
REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2 (2)
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REG INLET VLV (2
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REG INLET VLV (2
POSITION INDICATION, DS7 & DSII (2)
DIODE, DS7 & DSII (4)
SWITCH, SI4 & S22/REG. INLET VLV (2)
SWITCH, S14 & S22/REG. INLET VLV (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB21 (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB21 (2)
RESISTOR, AI8RI & AllRl (5.1K) (2)
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)
NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)
LINES & FITTINGS
FILTER/CHECK VALVE, AFTER N2 REG (2)
FILTER/CHECK VALVE, AFTER N2 REG (2)
FILTER/CHECK VALVE, AFTER N2 REG (2)
FLOW SENSOR (2)
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2) (PNL M010W)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)
ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS, CONTINUED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
277 3/3 3/3
278 3/2R 3/2R
279 3/IR 3/1R
280 3/1R 3/1R
281 3/2R 3/2R
282 3/IR 3/IR
283 3/1R 3/1R
284 3/IR 3/1R
285 3/3 3/3
286 3/3 3/3
287 3/2R 3/2R
288 3/IR 3/IR
* 289 i/i i/i
290 3/IR 3/IR
291 3/IR 3/IR
* 292 i/i i/i
293 3/IR 3/IR
294 3/3 3/3
295 3/3 3/3
296 3/IR 3/IR
297 3/IR 3/IR
* 298 2/IR 2/IR
* 299 2/IR 2/IR
300 3/3 3/3
* 301 2/IR 2/IR
302 3/IR 3/1R
303 3/3 3/3
304 3/3 3/3
305 3/3 3/3
306 3/3 3/3
307 3/2R 3/2R
308 3/IR 3/1R
309 3/2R 3/2R
310 3/IR 3/1R
311 3/2R 3/2R
* 312 2/2 2/2
313 3/3 3/3
314 3/3 3/3
315 3/3 3/3
316 3/3 3/3
* 317 2/1R 2/1R
318 3/3 3/3
319 3/3 3/3
320 3/3 3/3
321 3/3 3/3
NITROGEN ASSEMBLY, CONTINUED
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REG INLET (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REG INLET (2)
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REG INLET (2)
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
RELIEF VALVE
RELIEF VALVE
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE (i)
H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE (i)
SWITCH, S28 (i)
SWITCH, S28 (i)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI5 (i)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI5 (i)
RESISTOR, A3R3,5.1K (I)
FILTER
02/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)
02/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)
02/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)
POS. INDICATOR/N2/02 CONT. VALVE (i)
SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONT.VALVE (2)
SWITCH, SI6&Slg/O2/N2 CONT. VALVE (2)
SWITCH, SI6&Slg/O2/N2 CONT. VALVE (2)
RESISTOR,AI3RI&2,AI4RI,AISRI&2 5.1K (5)
SWITCH SI7/PPO2 SENSOR A&B (i)
SWITCH SI7/PPO2 SENSOR A&B (i)
02/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
02/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
02/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
PP02 SENSORS A+B (2)
PPO2 SENSORS A+B (2)
PP02 SENSOR-C (I)
SWITCH, PPO2 CONTROLLER (2)
SWITCH, PP02 CONTROLLER (2)
RESISTORS/10K (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB18&CB19 (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB18&CB19 (2)
SWITCH, S6/PP02 SELECTOR (1)
METER, M4/PP02 READING (1)
SWITCH, $5/02/N2 FLOW SELECTOR (1)
METER, M3/O2/N2 FLOW READING (1)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS, CONTINUED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
322 3/2R 3/3
323 3/3 3/3
324 3/2R 3/3
325 3/3 3/3
326 3/3 3/3
* 327 2/2 3/3
328 3/3 3/3
* 329 2/IR 2/IR
330 3/2R 3/2R
* 331 2/1R 2/IR
332 3/2R 3/2R
333 3/3 /NA
334 3/3 3/3
335 3/2R 3/2R
336 3/3 /NA
* 337 2/IR 2/IR
338 3/2R 3/2R
339 3/3 3/3
340 3/3 3/3
341 3/3 3/3
* 342 2/1R 2/1R
* 343 2/IR 2/IR
* 344 2/IR 2/IR
345 3/3 3/3
346 3/3 /NA
347 3/3 /NA
* 348 2/1R 2/1R
349 3/3 3/3
350 3/3 /NA
351 3/3 /NA
352 3/3 /NA
353 3/3 /NA
354 3/3 /NA
355 3/3 /NA
356 3/3 /NA
357 3/3 3/3
358 3/3 3/3
359 3/3 /NA
* 360 2/IR 2/IR
* 361 2/IR 2/IR
POSITIVE RELIEF VAVLE ASSEMBLY, CONTINUE
CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (i)
METER, M4/CABIN PRESSURE READING (i)
CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (I)
METER, M3/DP/DT READING (I)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (i)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (i)
KLAXON/DP/DT (I)
POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY
LINES & FITTINGS
ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)
ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)
MOTOR/ISOLATION VALVE (2)
MOTOR/ISOLATION VALVE (2)
POSITION INDICATION, DSl, DS2 (2)
SWITCH, SI_S2/POS RELIEF VALVE (2)
SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2
SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7&CB22 (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBIT&CB22 (2)
RESISTOR, AIR1 & A2RI, 5.1K (2)
DIODE, DSl & DS2 (4)
RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
CABIN VENT ASSEMBLY
RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
FILTER (2)
FILTER (2)
FILTER (i)
FILTER (i)
VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)
VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)
SWITCH, S3 & S4
SWITCH, S3 & S4
SWITCH, S3 & S4
SWITCH, S3 & S4
POSITION INDICATION, DS3, DS4 (2)
RESISTOR, A3RI, A4RI, 5.1K (2)
DIODE, DS3 &DS4 (4)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
NEGATIVE RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY
RELIEF VALVE (2)
RELIEF VALVE (2)
* Potential Critical Item
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TABLE III - ARPCS HARDWARE ITEMS, CONCLUDED
CRITICALITY
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ABORT ITEM
* 362 2/IR 2/1R
363 3/3 3/3
* 364 2/IR 2/IR
365 3/3 3/3
366 3/2R 3/3
NEGATIVE RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY, CONTINUED
CAP (2)
CAP (2)
DEBRIS SCREEN (2)
DEBRIS SCREEN (2)
CHECK VALVE (2)
* Potential Critical Item
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ARPCS
ARS
ATCS
ATO
BFS
CIL
CO
C02
CRT
C/W
CRIT
dc
ECLSS
EMU
EPS
EVA
F
FES
FM
FMEA
GN2
GSE
GPC
H20
IMU
IOA
LEH
LiOH
MDAC
NA
NASA
N2
NSTS
0MRSD
OPS
O2
OMS
PCI
PP02
psi
psia
psid
psig
RI
RMS
RTLS
- Abort Once Around
- Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control
Subsystem
- Air Revitalization System
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort to Orbit
- Back-up Flight System
- Critical Item List
- Carbon Monoxide
- Carbon Dioxide
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning
- Criticality
- Direct Current
- Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Electrical Power Subsystem
- Extravehicular Activity
- Fahrenheit
- Flash Evaporator System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Ground Support Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Water
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Oriber Assessment
- Launch and Entry Helmets
- Lithium Hydroxide
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nitrogen
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
- Operational Sequence
- Oxygen
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Potential Critical Items
- Partial Pressure of Oxygen
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
- Rockwell International
- Remote Manipulator System
- Return to Launch Site
A-I
RTLS
SM
SRB
SSME
STS
SW
TAL
TD
WMS
- Return to Landing Site
- Systems Management
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software
- Trans-Atlantic Landing
- Touch Down
- Waste Management System
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 19____[ were used with the _-[lowing
_plifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
tra---nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-I_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at ra_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amp--_ifications _d additions•
l ,
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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•
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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Appendix B
Definitions, Ground Rules, and Assumptions
B.3 ARPCS - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The following subsystem ground rules and assumptions were
considered in determining component criticalities:
i • The auxiliary oxygen assembly was assigned criticali-
ties based upon its emergency support function not
redundant to cryogenics oxygen supply.
Rationale: The auxiliary oxygen assembly is a mission
kit installed on OVl02 only. Its usage is
under severe cabin leak and loss of
cryogenic oxygen.
. The airlock and wet trash storage vents are considered
as part of the Environmental Control and Life Support
Subsystem (ECLSS) and therefore not studied in this
report.
Rationale: These subsystem interfaces were discussed
and decided by the NASA subsystem manager
(Mr. John Whalen) to be part of the ECLSS.
• A single cabin regulation/distribution loop is
considered adequate to maintain nominal pressure
throughout the mission.
Rationale: Flight Data File procedures have been
written, and the subsystem designed to
operate on one loop with the other loop
in standby redundancy.
. The oxygen and nitrogen contained within cabin volume
are adequate without make-up for safe and nominal
return•
Rationale: Under nominal 3.2 psia PP02 cabin pressure,
and return duration (approximately 4 hours
from deorbit prep to touchdown), there is
adequate oxygen to meet crew metabolic.
. The PASS/BFS displays are not considered redundant to
an on-board meter display when studying the meter
failure modes.
Rationale: The PASS/BFS failure is considered
unlikely, and if happened it shall be under
multiple failure scenarios.
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i0.
ll.
Each LEH panel is considered to be dedicated to a crew
person, and as such it is not redundant to the others.
Rationale: A crew person is not denied oxygen in order
to meet the demand of others.
During a cabin leak condition, no oxygen flow is
considered through 8/14.7 psia regulators. Oxygen is
provided to the crew and cabin through LEH's and direct
bleed orifice respectively.
Rationale: Severe cabin leak and oxygen flow through
regulators will deplete crogenic oxygen
rapidly. Oxygen is only needed to keep the
crew alive not to maintain cabin pressure.
Pressurization of cabin or any compartment with direct
and unregulated oxygen is considered a serious fire
hazard, thus creating a potential condition for loss of
life/vehlcle.
Rationale: Oxygen by itself will not cause fire, but
the condition created is volatile for fire.
Pressurization of cabin or any compartment with direct
and unregulated nitrogen is considered a potential for
structural failure. Furthermore, in an event when ARPCS
will be depleted of consumable nitrogen, a potentially
critical condition is created due to loss of capability
to maintain cabln/water tanks pressure•
Rationale: The nitrogen tanks are pressurized at
approximately 3300 psia, and any enclosed
compartment will be excessively pressurized
with a direct leakage. The degree of
pressurization, location and severity of
failure are moot. The author has taken a
conservative view on the subject.
Cabin pressure will be adequate to maintain water dump
and FES (Flash Evaporator System) operations in the
event of pressure loss from ARPCS.
Rationale: Under nominal 14.7 psia cabin pressure, the
FES and water dump operations will not be
affected, but rather minimized. Adequate
pressure exists to expel the water.
Nitrogen and oxygen flow sensors are considered mission
critical instrumentation needed for quick leak detec-
tion and prevention•
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Rationale: Loss of these instrumentation creates a
condition whereby a cabin leak may not be
easily and readily detected for successful
completion of the mission.
Any voluntary cabin vent is accomplished through
airlock/vent valves during on-orbit.
Rationale: Due to high cabin vent rate through the
cabin vent/isolation valves, this option
is not viable.
The prelaunch criticality was considered to be of
mission impact only when that failure caused loss of
life/vehicle or loss of mission any time from liftoff
to landing.
Rationale: No launch was considered performed when a
failure may result in loss of life/vehicle
or mission after liftoff regardless of
time to repair.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, 10 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
b-_to--m--6f each sheet?-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOAANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of llfe or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
I01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR-V61P2166A(1)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) ATM MAKE-UP/CONTROL
3) AUXILIARY 02
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO MONITOR AUXILIARY 02 PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF THE 300
PSI REGULATOR-NOT SAFETY OR MISSION CRITICAL. V64JP0202A, EVLSS
02 SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR MAY BE USED TO READ THE LINE PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR- V61T2216A(1)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 (SUPPLY TANK)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
ME449-0010
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO MONITOR AUX. 02 TANK TEMPERATURE-NOT MISSION OR
SAFETY CRITICAL. NO OTHER TEMPERATURE SENSOR EXISTS TO READ THE
LINE TEMPERATURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (i)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY (SUPPLY TANK)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
1/l
1/l
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC282-0082-0050
CAUSES: OVER PRESSURIZATION, TEMPERATURE, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK RUPTURE AFTER L/O AND PRIOR TO LANDING IS EXPECTED TO
SEVERELY IMPACT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. AUXILIARY
OXYGEN IS NOT AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED, POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (1)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY (SUPPLY TANK)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/i AOA:
DEORBIT: i/I ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC282-0082-0050
CAUSES: OVER PRESSURIZATION, TEMPERATURE, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLOW LEAK WILLRESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE HAZARD
LEADING TO CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. ALSO, LOSS OF OXYGEN WHEN
NEEDED. NOTE: LARGE LEAK WOULD HAVE SAME EFFECT AS A RUPTURED
TANK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR-V61P2161A (I)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DETECT PRESSURE OF AUX. 02 TANK-NOT MISSION OR
SAFETY CRITICAL. TWO OTHER PRESSURE SENSORS EXIST DOWNSTREAM TO
SENSE THE LINE PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUPPLY VALVE-LV5(1)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL LOSS, CORROSION,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRELAUNCH SERVICING OF THE TANK (QUICK DISCONNECT IS NOT
SELF-SEALING. THUS CAP CANNOT BE INSTALLED). OTHERWISE, THE
VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN-NOT A SAFETY ITEM. REGULATORS PLUS THE
DOWNSTREAM ISOLATION VALVE WILL PROVIDE FLOW ON DEMAND.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUPPLY VALVE-LVS(1)
FAILED CLOSED, CLOGGED FILTERS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/i
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL LOSS, CORROSION,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUXILIARY OXYGEN TO THE CREW WHEN NEEDED ASSUMING NO
CRYOGENIC OXYGEN AND EMERGENCY CONDITION EXISTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: SUPPLY VALVE-LVS(1)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS AUX. 02 TANK EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, MDAC ID 104.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
109 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
POSITION INDICATION, DS8 (i)
FAILS TO CONDUCT AT ANY CONTACT POSITION, FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, MECHANICAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION NOT MISSION/SAFETY CRITICAL
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
ii0 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DS8 (2)
OPEN, SHORTS, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
JANTXV IN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION. NO EFFECT AND NON-ESSENTIAL
ITEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-II
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (1)
LOSS OF OUTPUT (VALVE IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYSTf R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
s)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: NONE
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRELAUNCH SERVICING OF THE TANK, OTHERWISE NO EFFECT. SEE
ALSO MDAC ID 106.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT (VALVE IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: NONE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUXILIARY OXYGEN TO THE CREW WHEN NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-S12
SWITCH FAILED OPEN OR PARTIALLY OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7205
B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCHING ACTION, BUT SINCE THE VALVE IS CONFIGURED OPEN,
IT WILL REMAIN IN THE OPEN POSITION-NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: SWITCH-S12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVES THE VALVE TO CLOSED POSITION, THUS LOSS OF OXYGEN TO CREW
WHEN NEEDED. IN ABORT SITUATIONS, THE CREW CAN RETURN ON CABIN
VOLUME EXCEPT FOR ATO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, A9R2, 5.1K (I)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
e)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: RLR05C512GR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 116 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, A9R2, 5.1K (i)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: RLR05CSI2GR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION ANY CONTACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI6
FAILED OPEN, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-00026-2030
CAUSES: PIECE FAILURE, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPERATE MOTOR, SWITCH, AND POSITION INDICATION.
HOWEVER, VALVE NOMINALLY OPEN. 02 REMAINS AVAILABLE ON DEMAND.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
118 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI6
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-00026-2030
CAUSES: PIECE FAILURE, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOMINALLY CLOSED. NEED TO OPEN IS DUE TO DOWNSTREAM ELECTRICAL
COMPONENT FAILURES ACCOUNTED FOR ELSEWHERE, LOSS OF POSSIBLE
CIRCUIT OVERLOAD PROTECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0310
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 INTO PAYLOAD BAY AND VENTED OUT (NO FIRE HAZARD
PERHAPS), BUT DEPLETES OXYGEN FROM CREW USEAGE FOR WHEN NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (i)
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-03 i0
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SERVICE THE AUX. 02 TANK DURING PRELAUNCHAND
LANDING SAFING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT/GSE (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST:R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0310
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, SINCE THE GSE CAP WILL BLOCK ANY FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: FILTER, i0 MICRONS (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
9REAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
,_MC
A_- 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIK_
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT H_/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCREASES TIME REQUIRED TO FILL AUX. 02 TANK, OR CHANGE FILTER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER, 10 MICRONS (1)
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICAL£TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /q¢A
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO FILL THE TANK.
IMPACTING THE MISSION.
IT WOULD REQUIRE REPAIR, THUS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP/GSE DISCONNECT
INABILITY TO MATE, OR DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0360
CAUSES: VIBRATION SHOCK, CORROSION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULTY SERVICING THE TANK, BUT THE PROBLEM CAN BE REPAIRED
WITHOUT ANY IMPACT ON THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM: CAP/GSE DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0360
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GASEOUS OXYGEN DEPLETES SUPPLY FOR CREW USE WHEN IT IS
NEEDED-POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE EXISTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (I)
FAIL OPEN IST OR 2ND STAGE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, THE FAILURE OF ONE STAGE WILL NOT INHIBIT THE PROPER
OPERATION OF THE OTHER STAGE REGULATOR. THE EFFECT OF THE TANK
HIGH PRESSURE ON THE SECOND STAGE WITH THE FIRST STAGE FAILURE
WAS CONSIDERED MINIMAL. THE TWO STAGE REGULATORS WERE TREATED
AS TWO SEPARATE REGULATORS WITH A SINGLE FUNCTIONAL PATH.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (1)
FAILED CLOSED, 1ST OR SECOND STAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPLETE LOSS OF 02 WHEN NEEDED UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITION AND
LOSS OF CRYO-O2.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, IST OR 2ND STAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 WHEN NEEDED. POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO FIRE HAZARD FROM OXYGEN RICH CABIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 DURING USE, OR FOR WHEN IT IS NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
130 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
4)
S)
6)
"l)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE NORMALLY CLOSED, NO OTHER FAILURES ASSUMED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 DURING USE. POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
FIRE HAZARD FROM OXYGEN RICH CABIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
132 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (i)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT WHEN CRYO 02 IS IN USE, THE PRESSURE IS ASSUMED LOW
ENOUGH NOT TO CRACK THE RELIEF VALVE (1250 PSIG) OPEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
133 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (i)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 WHEN NEEDED, POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
134 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) AUX. 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUX. 02 WHEN NEEDED. IN ADDITION, LOSS OF REGULAR
OXYGEN, UNLESS THE CROSSOVER VALVES ARE CLOSED. FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _c
3) AUX. 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, FATIGUE, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUXILIARY OXYGEN AND SUBSEQUENT FIRE HAZARD CONDITION.
OXYGEN NOT AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED-LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
136 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR-V64P0202A(1)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME449-0177-9505
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO KNOW PRESSURE OF 02 ENTERING EMU SUPPLY VALVES, LEH
SUPPLY, OR DIRECT 02 VALVE. NOT MISSION OR SAFETY CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, THE VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN THROUGHOUT THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE 02 SUPPLY SYSTEM WILL BE ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE FOR NOMINAL
MISSION 02 REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, FOR AN EMERGENCY SITUATION AND
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, NO 02 WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW
THROUGH LEH AND DIRECT 02 ORIFICE - POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED 02 SUPPLY SYSTEM WILL HAVE TO BE ISOLATED. SEE NOTE FOR
FAILED CLOSED SCENARIO (MDAC ID 138).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
140 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPEN)
SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
SWITCH FAILED OPEN, OR PARTIALLY OPEN (VALVE IS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _vIC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, THE VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN THROUGHOUT THE MISSION.
(SEE MDAC ID 137 FOR VALVE.)
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
SWITCH FAILED CLOSED (VALVE IS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TO CREW (THROUGH LEH'S) DURING
ASCENT/ENTRY AND EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. ON-ORBIT, THE CABIN
REGULATORS WILL PROVIDE OXYGEN TO THE CABIN, BUT LOSS OF RECHARGE
CAPABILITY TO EMUIS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-AI2RI & R2/5.1K (2)
FAILED OPEN, SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: RLROSCSI2GR
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION. VALVE POSITION CAN BE CHECKED
BY SETTING UP THE 02 SYSTEM TO FLOW OXYGEN THROUGH THE CROSSOVER,
OR SENSING FLOW THROUGH THE DIRECT OXYGEN BLEED TO THE CABIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI9 & CB20 (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE FAILURE, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY (VALVE FAILS IN CLOSED POSITION).
OXYGEN DOES NOT FLOW TO LEH'S, EMU'S, AND DIRECT BLEED ORIFICE
WHEN NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
144 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI9 & CB20 (2)
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: PIECE FAILURE, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OVER-LOAD CIRCUIT PROTECTION. CB NOMINALLY CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME286-0061-0001
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, DAMAGED ELEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE FILTER COULD RESULT IN ABORT DECISION WITH ONE 02
SYSTEM AVAILABLE. CLOGGING BOTH FILTERS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF 02 TO
CREW WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
DAMAGED ELEMENT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M_
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2)
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME286-0061-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN FILTER HAS NO EFFECT ON THE SUBSYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE
CONTAMINANTS MAY POSE HAZARDS TO COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM, BUT THESE
ARE COVERED SEPARATELY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
147 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LOOP 2)
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR IN
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED) (LOOP i)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/!R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
V070-614100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LOOP 1 02, LEAVES ONLY LOOP 2 LEADING TO ABORT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-48
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
148 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
LOOP2)
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR IN
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED) (LOOP 2)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) ___c
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
V070-614100
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINGLE ORIFICE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON LOOP 2 SINCE I0
LBM/HR CAN FLOW FROM THE OTHER ORIFICE. REDUCED TOTAL FLOW FROM
LOOP 1 AND 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
149 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LOOP2)
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE- (ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR IN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-614100
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OXYGEN SYSTEM, NEXT FAILURE IS POTENTIALLY LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
150 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3 ) 02 ASSY.
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [*P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE, CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V070-613130
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 02 ASSEMBLY (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY) WILL LEAD TO SHORTER
MISSION. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY MEANS LOSS OF 02 FOR CREW USEAGE AND
CABIN PRESSURIZATION. ALSO POSES FIRE HAZARD.
*FAILURE IS DETECTABLE BY CABIN PP02 SENSOR AND CRYO 02 RATE OF
FLOW INDICATION. HOWEVER EXACT LOCATION OF THE LEAK MAY NOT BE
OBVIOUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVES ARE NOMINALLY OPEN DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY. THE LEH'S
COULD BE ISOLATED DURING ONORBIT BY RESPECTIVE LEH PANEL SHUTOFF
VALVES (PNL C6). IN ADDITION, THE QUICK DISCONNECTS ARE SELF
SEALING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 152 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [*P ] c[p]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 VALVE CAN BE TOLERATED BY PROVIDING 02 TO THE CREW
THROUGH OTHER SUPPLY VALVE OR DIRECT 02 OR CABIN REGULATOR.
HOWEVER, UNDER ANEMERGENCY SITUATION, CREW MAY BE 02 STARVED IF
HIGH DP/DT DROP OCCURS.
* OXYGEN FLOW THROUGH THE LEH IS DIRECTLY DETECTABLE BY CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
153 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [*P ] c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS VALVE FAILED CLOSED. (MDAC ID 152.)
* OXYGEN FLOW (OR LACK OF) THROUGH THE LEH IS DIRECTLY DETECTABLE
BY CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
154 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 REGULATOR (2)
FAILED OPEN, LOSS OF REGULATION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AMC
O2 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [*P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE,
BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE RELIEF VALVE (245 PSIG) TO CRACK OPEN RAISING
PP02 LEVEL IN CABIN AND DENYING LEH FLOW FROM THE AFFECTED LOOP.
POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD.
* OXYGEN FLOW THROUGH THE LEH IS DETECTABLE BY CREW. IN
ADDITION, THE RELIEF VALVE WILL OPEN, AND PPO2 WILL GO HIGH
TRIGGERING THE KLAXON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 REGULATOR (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [*P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE,
BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AFFECTED VALVE ISOLATES OXYGEN FLOW FROM THE CREW,
LEADING TO ABORT DECISION.
* OXYGEN FLOW (OR LACK OF) THROUGH THE LEH IS DIRECTLY DETECTABLE
BY CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-S6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 156
ITEM: LEG 02 REGULATOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [*P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE,
BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WILL BE ISOLATED BY SHUTTING OFF THE LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE,
THUS LOSS OF REDUNDANCY LEADING TO ABORT DECISION.
* OXYGEN FLOW (OR LACK OF) THROUGH THE LEH IS DIRECTLY DETECTABLE
BY CREW. PPO2 WILL GO HIGH TRIGGERING THE KLAXON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 157 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _c
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [*P ] c[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES INCREASED CABIN PPO2 LEVEL REQUIRING DEACTIVATION
OF THE AFFECTED LEG; THUS AN ABORT DECISION. LEH FLOW MAY NOT BE
MAINTAINED UNDER SEVER DEPRESSURIZATION.
* READILY DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
158 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, HOWEVER UNABLE TO DEPRESSURIZE THE LINES DOWNSTREAM OF
THE REGULATOR WHEN REGULATOR FAILS OPEN (COVERED BY MDAC ID 154).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
159 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [*P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOTALLY CLOGGED FILTER WILL FORCE THE REGULATOR TO SHUT-OFF THE
FLOW THUS LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG-ABORT DECISION.
* SEE MDAC ID 155.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
DAMAGED FILTER (FULL OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMc
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION IN THE LEHwS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _c
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, HOWEVER FAILURE OF THIS VALVE COMBINED WITH AN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OR FAILED OPENRELIEF VALVE WILL FORCE
DEACTIVATION OF LEH THUS CRITICALITY 2/IR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREVENTS FLOW OF OXYGEN TO THE CREW THROUGH LEH'S WHEN NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3 ) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0004-0006
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT WHEN IN USE DURING ASCENT, ENTRY OR EMERGENCY.
OTHERWISE, LEH SYSTEM MAY BE DEACTIVATED BY LEH SUPPLY VALVES-PCS
WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE OXYGEN. NOT HAVING LEH #'S MAY TRIGGER C&W.
CREW DISCOMFORT. REDUNDANCY NOT ASSUMED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 164 ABORT:
ITEM: LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0004-0006
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
I/i
i/I
cc ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ANY LEH VALVE WILL DENY 02 TO THAT CREWMEMBER,
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
165 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
I/i
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0004-0006
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MAY DENY DIRECT 02 TO THE LEH IN THE EVENT OF SEVERE
CABIN LEAK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
166 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
INABILITY TO MATE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
s)
s)
v)
s)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: I/I AOA:
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: F361-2660-3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
I/i
i/i
c[ ]
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MAY DENY DIRECT 02 TO THE LEH IN THE EVENT OF SEVERE
CABIN LEAK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
INABILITY TO DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: F361-2660-3
] B[ ] cC ]
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, CREW INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
168 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: QUICK DISCONNECTS(8)EXTERNALLEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
EMERGENCY BREATHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: i/I AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: F361-2660-3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
c [ ]
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MAY DENY DIRECT 02 TO THE LEH IN THE EVENT OF SEVERE
CABIN LEAK. THE LEAK CAN BE ISOLATED BY CLOSING THE SHUTOFF
VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: F361-2660-3
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT WHEN LEH IS IN NORMAL USE. OTHERWISE, IT CAN BE
ISOLATED BY CLOSING THE SHUTOFF VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
170 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
INABILITY TO MATE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THERE ARE 8 HOOK UP POINTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
INABILITY TO DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY ASSUMED. THIS FAILURE MAY DENY 02 TO A CREWMEMBER
IN THE EVENT OF SEVERE CABIN LEAK. WHEN 8 CREWMEMBERS ARE
PRESENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
172 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMc
3 ) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c C ]
CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. CREW INCONVENIENCE, POSSIBLE C&W.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
173 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP/LEH Q.DSCNT (8)
BREAKAGE
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2)
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, THE SELF-SEALED DISCONNECT WILL HOLD PRESSURE. ALSO,
WHEN LEH IS NOT IN USE, THE SOV IS CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
174 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (i)
FAILED OPEN, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 2/ 2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOMINALLY THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE FAILURE CREATES A FIRE HAZARD
WITH AN OXYGEN-RICH CABIN. IT IS PARTICULARLY LIFE THREATENING
DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY WHEN THE CREW IS ON LEH AND THE LEAK
CANNOT BE ISOLATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
175 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (i)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) O2 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOMINALLY NO EFFECT, HOWEVER, WITH CABIN LEAKCONDITION, 02 FLOW
MAY BE PROVIDED BY CONFIGURING ONE OF THE O2/N2 CONTROL VALVES TO
FLOW ONLY OXYGEN WHILE THE OTHER WILL FLOW ONLY NITROGEN. LEH-O2
FLOW WILL BE MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ORIFICE-DIRECT BLEED (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) EMERGENCY BREATHING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE WORST CASE HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS MDAC ID 175.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS : 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT 02 LEG-ABORT DECISION. NOMINAL CABIN + CREW
USEAGE CAN BE MAINTAINED BY THE UNAFFECTED LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 178 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN (C.V)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3 ) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT WHEN 02 IS FLOWING. POSSIBLE BACK FLOW OF CONTAMINANTS
ON NON-FLOW 02 LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER/CHECK VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
S)
6)
V)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY LEG BY ISOLATING THE 02 SYSTEM. SAME AS VALVE
FAILED CLOSED. (MDAC ID 177.)
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
180 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW SENSOR MTII&MTI2 (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL FLOW, ZERO FLOW)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
AMC
02 ASSY.
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
3/2R TAL: 3/2R
3/2R AOA: 3/2R
3/2R ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCKS, THERMAL
STRESS, ELECTRICAL, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 02 FLOW MEASUREMENT FOR DETECTING CABIN LEAK QUICKLY.
LOSS OF C&W RED LIGHT IN THIS CASE. HIGH FLOW OF O2/N2 DUE TO
LEAK MAY MAINTAIN NOMINAL CABIN PRESSURE (NO CHANGE IN DP/DT)
WITHOUT BEING READILY NOTICED-THE IMPACT OF THIS FAILURE ON
DEORBIT/ABORT ARE DEBATABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-02 FLOW,S5 (1)
INABILITY TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0093-5025
CAUSES: MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL FAILURE,
CORROSION,CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FLOW READING ON THE METER. PASS/BFS DISPLAYS MAY BE USED
TO MONITOR THE FLOW. THE FAILURE OF ON-BOARD FLOW RATE WILL HAVE
THE SAME EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C'82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C&W-O2/N2 FLOW (I)
INABILITY TO LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHORT, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, HIGH FLOWRATES ARE MONITORED BY O2/N2 METER ORON-
BOARD DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR, REGULATOR INLET - MT3 & MT4
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL (OXYGEN REGULATOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT, PRESSURE CAN BE VERIFIED DOWNSTREAM OF THE REGULATOR
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL (OXYGEN REGULATOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE AFFECTED REGULATOR LEG. THE PCS MAY BE
OPERATED AUTO ON AFFECTED LEG OR MANUALLY WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM -
CREW INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
185 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL (OXYGEN REGULATOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE O2/N2 CONTROLLER LEG BY THE INABILITY TO FLOW OXYGEN
WHEN NEEDED. PRESSURE CAN BE MANAGED, AND 02 FLOW MAINTAINED TO
THE CREW THRU EITHER LEH OR DIRECT BLEED ORIFICE - ABORT
DECISION. THE FAILURE IS NOT CRITICAL DURING ASCENT OR ENTRY
SINCE CREW IS ON THE LEH SYSTEM AND THE SOV IS NOMINALLY CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
186 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL (OXYGEN REGULATOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKS MOST LIKELY INTO THE CABIN, RESULTING IN HIGH PPO2 (FIRE
HAZARD) FORCING CREW TO ISOLATE AFFECTED 02 SUPPLY LINE AND
CLOSING THE X-OVER VALVE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL DENY CREW LEH
02 FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR - I00 PSIG (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO 8/14.7 PSI REGULATORS, AND/OR CRACKING 245
PSIG OPEN TO CABIN RESULTING IN OXYGEN-RICH CABIN (FIRE HAZARD).
NO EFFECT ON ASCENT/ENTRY SINCE THE INLET SOY IS NOMINALLY
CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-88
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
188 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR - i00 PSIG (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3 ) 02 ASSY.
4) 02/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE O2/N2 CONTROLLER LEG BY THE INABILITY TO FLOW OXYGEN
WHEN NEEDED. PRESSURE CAN BE MANAGED, AND 02 FLOW MAINTAINED TO
THE CREW THRU EITHER LEH OR DIRECT BLEED ORIFICE - ABORT
DECISION. SEE ALSO MDAC ID 185 - REGULATOR INLET SOY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 189 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM: REGULATOR - I00 PSIG (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) 02/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS MDAC ID 186 - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
190 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 245 PSIG (2)
FAILED OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AND INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) 02/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/1R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO MODE OF 02/N2 CONTROLLERS, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ACCOUNTS FOR THE FACT THAT THERE IS A REDUNDANT LEG OF THE SYSTEM
AND THAT THE FAILED LEG CAN BE OPERATED MANUALLY BY OPENING AND
CLOSING THE SHUTOFF VALVE. ALSO LOSS OF FLOW TO S/L
MODULES. CABIN PRESSURE AND CREW USAGE MAY BE MANAGED MANUALLY,
HOWEVER, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR CABIN OXYGEN-RICH ENVIRONMENT
LEADING TO FIRE HAZARD WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 245 PSIG (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNDER NOMINAL CONDITION OF ASCENT OR ENTRY. HOWEVER,
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF FUNCTION TO VENT THE LINE IF NEEDED,
POSSIBLY DAMAGING 8/14.7 PSIA REGULATION. THIS IS LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY AND MISSION ABORT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/29/86
ARPCS
192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MF449-0177-6103
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, ELECTRICAL, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, PRESSURE CAN BE CHECKED BY THE PRESSURE-SENSOR
DOWNSTREAM OF 02/N2 CONTROL VALVE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WITHOUT S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) 02/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBILITY OF 200 PSI N2 BACK-FLOW WILL FORCE 02 REGULATOR TO
CLOSE AND SPACELAB 02 SUPPLY MUST BE SHUTOFF. OTHERWISE, PCS MAY
OPERATE IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE WITH NO EFFECT.
ALSO SEE MDAC ID 366 FOR FAILURE WITH S/L.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
194 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT LEG-ABORT DECISION. HOWEVER, OXYGEN
NECESSARY FOR CREW USAGE CAN BE MAINTAINED UNDER NOMINAL OR CABIN
LEAK CONDITIONS THROUGH LEH OR DIRECT BLEED ORIFICE. CABIN
PRESSURE CAN BE MAINTAINED BY THE NITROGEN SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN FLOWING UNREGULATED 02 AND N2 TO THE
CABIN FORCING THE AFFECTED O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE TO BE SHUT CLOSED
AS WELL AS THE 02 REGULATOR INLET SHUTOFF VALVE. UNREGULATED
OXYGEN LEAK POSES FIRE HAZARD. LOSS OF ONE N2 AND 02 REDUNDANT
LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-96
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 196 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V070-614112
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 02 REDUNDANT LEG, ABORT DECISION. OTHERWISE UNREGULATED
02 INTO THE CABIN WILL RAISE PP02 (FIRE HAZARD), SUBSEQUENTLY
FORCING ISOLATION OF THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
197 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WITHOUT SPACELAB)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, SINCE THE LINE IS CAPPED TIGHT AT THE END TO HOLD
FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WITH S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE S/L, RESULTING IN
UNREGULATED/CONTINUOUS FLOW OF OXYGEN INTO THE S/L MODULE, OXYGEN
RICH MODULE POSES FIRE HAZARD. OTHER REDUNDANT LEG OR DIRECT
BLEED ORIFICE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE OXYGEN FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED (WITHOUT S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/2R
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED (WITH S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE OXYGEN DEFICIENCY IN THE MODULE, LIFE SCIENCE CREW WORK
IMPACT, ABORT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED 02 INTO THE CABIN WILL RAISE THE PPO2 LEVEL
AND FORCE CREW TO ISOLATE THAT LEG. IN THIS CASE THE 02 WILL BE
ALSO DENIED TO THE PAYLOAD (IF FLOWN). CABIN-RICH OXYGEN WILL
POSE FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I02
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED ORIFICE (WITH S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3 ) 02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LACK OF 02 TO MEET P/L REQUIREMENTS AND LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT
LEG, 02 CAN BE PROVIDED THRU THE OTHER LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL,
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, MISHANDLING, FATIGUE, POROSITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED 02 INTO THE CREW CABIN RESULTING IN OXYGEN
RICH CABIN, FIRE HAZARD. OTHERWISE LINE MUST BE ISOLATED (LOSS OF
REDUNDANT LEG) AND OPERATE THE P/L FROM REDUNDANT LEG, AND OR
CREW CABIN AIR TRANSFER THROUGH TUNNEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR, MT7 & MT8 (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, CABIN REGULATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME449-0177-6103
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATIN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE MEASUREMENT DOWNSTREAM OF THE 02/N2 CONTROL
VALVE. HOWEVER, THE 02 AND N2 PRESSURES CAN BE ALSO READ FROM
ADDITIONAL SENSORS DOWNSTREAM OF 100/200 PSIA REGULATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i05
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, CABIN REGULATION
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 8 PSI REGULATOR OPERATION DURING CABIN
LEAK/EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. THIS WILL DEPLETE CONSUMABLES EARLIER
THAN 8.0 PSIA CABIN REGULATION, THUS SHORTENING THE TIME THAT
CABIN COULD BE MAINTAINED PRESSURIZED. POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, CABIN REGULATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LEG OF 14.7 CABIN REGULATION DURING ON-ORBIT-DOCKING
ASCENT/ENTRY, ARPCS IS CONFIGURED FOR 8.0 PIA REGULATION. CABIN
CAN BE MAINTAINED AT 14.7 OR 8.0 PSIA FROM THE REDUNDANT LEG, OR
8.0 PSIA AT AFFECTED LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, CABIN REGULATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF CONTINUOUS/UNREGULATED NITROGEN INTO THE CABIN ACTIVATES
THE POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLETES NITROGEN
SUPPLY FROM THE AFFECTED SYSTEM (TWO TANKS). OXYGEN WILL BE
DEPLETED IN THE SAME WAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
208 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
14.7 PSI REGULATOR
FAILED OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF UNREGULATED N2/O2 INTO THE CABIN CREATING SAME EFFECT AS
MDAC ID 207 - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. EXCEPT FOR
ASCENT/ENTRY THE REGULATOR INLET SOY IS CLOSED TO CONFIGURE TO
8.0 PSIA REGULATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
209 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
14.7 PSI REGULATOR (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 14.7 PSI REGULATION, CREW CAN RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME OR
8.0 PSIA REGULATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-ll0
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
8 PSI REGULATOR (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY.
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, 8 PSI REGULATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
C[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALTERNATE FLOW OF UNREGULATED N2 AND 02 INTO THE CABIN WITH
INTERMITTANT VENTING UNTIL CONSUMABLES ARE DEPLETED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
8 PSI REGULATOR (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
02 ASSY.
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, 8 PSI REGULATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN ARPCS CONFIGURED TO 8.0 PSIA REGULATION, THIS FAILURE WILL
NOT ALLOW O2/N2 FLOW INTO THE CABIN TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE.
THUS DECOMPRESSION OF THE CABIN WILL OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
N2 TANKS (4)
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0082-0040
B [ P] C [ F ]
CAUSES: FATIGUE, OVERPRESSURIZATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF NITROGEN FOR CABIN PRESSURE MAINTENANCE, AND
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT AREA WITH POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR (4)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
ME449-0010-0007
CAUSES: CORROSION, ELECTRICAL, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT; TELEMETRY DATA ONLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE AND CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE NITROGEN SYSTEM AND THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN
PRESSURE. OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT WITH POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE. BOTH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
FAILED TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _c
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: / NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0380
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO SERVICE THE TANKS PRELAUNCH, RESULTING IN MISSION
DELAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/z
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/l
1/l
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0380
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF N2 FROM THE FOUR SUPPLY TANKS RESULTING IN LOSS OF CABIN
PRESSURE MAINTENANCE. ALSO OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT
AREA.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE CAP (1)
INABILITY TO MATE, DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0361
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK CORROSION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TANK SERVICING DURING PRELAUNCH, CAUSING DELAY DUE TO
REPAIR/REPLACEMENT OF THE PIECE AND RESERVICING THE TANKS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-118
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE CAP (i)
EXTERNAL LEAK, INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0361
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 FROM FOUR SUPPLY TANKS. DEPLETION OF N2 FOR PRESSURE
MAINTENANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE FILTER (I)-i0 MICRONS
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TANKS SERVICING PROCEDURE DURING PRELAUNCH AND
POSTLANDING. THE PIECE MUST BE REPLACED AND TANKS RESERVICED-
MISSION DELAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE FILTER (i)-i0 MICRONS
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL OUTPUT, ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY PANEL/40V61AI6
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TANKS PRESSURE INDICATION-TANK PRESSURE CAN BE CHECKED
DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY PANEL/40V61A16
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0556-0001
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF NITROGEN TO P/L (MMU) RESULTING ON MISSION LOSS. VALVE IS
NOMINALLY CLOSED UNTIL NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-123
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY PANEL/40V61A16
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 2 R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0556-0001
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION SHOCK, BINDING/JAM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MMU FLOWN-NOT ABLE TO USE MMU, REMOVAL OF MMU WILL DEPLETE N2-
SYSTEM, MISSION IMPACT. MMU NOT FLOWN-LINES CAPPED OFF TO HOLD
PRESSURE-NO LEAK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
224 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2 SUPPLY PANEL/40V61AI6
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
ME284-0556-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GASEOUS NITROGEN AND PRESSURE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY.
ALSO, LOSS OF PRESSURE HEAD NEEDED TO OPERATE WATER TANKS FOR
DUMP AND FES COOLING-FES COOLING DURING ASCENT/ENTRY IS CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, DS8&DS9 (2)
INABILITY TO LATCH PROPERLY
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL/PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, BINDING/JAMMING, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACCURATE VALVE POSITION INDICATION. FLOW WILL INDICATE
VALVE OPEN/CLOSE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
226
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DSS&DS9 (4)
OPEN, SHORTS, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL/PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION. NO EFFECT, NON-ESSENTIAL ITEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, DS8&S9,5.1K (4)
ANY CREDIBLE FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL/PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION. NO EFFECT, NOT MISSION
ESSENTIAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-SI0&SII, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL/PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL DRIVE THE ISOLATION VALVE OPEN-SEE MDAC ID 223 FAILED OPEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-SI0&SII, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
CLOSE, OR MIDDLE POSITION-UNABLE TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL/PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL DRIVE THE VALVE CLOSE-SEE MDAC ID 222. IF NOT ABLE TO
SWITCH, THE VALVE REMAINS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-130
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB69&CB74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE ASSOCIATED SW, VALVE, AND VALVE POSITION
INDICATION, VALVE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSED POSITION, NOT SUPPLYING
N2 TO MMU IF NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
231 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB69&CB74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)
CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, LOSS OF CIRCUIT OVERLOAD PROTECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES & FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (DOWNSTREAM OF MMU ISOL.VLV)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) _c
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE AND CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE NITROGEN REQUIRED FOR PRESSURE MAINTENANCE.
ASCENT/ENTRY NOT AFFECTED SINCE THE SOV IS CLOSED. WITHOUT THE
MMU 3/3 CAN BE ASSIGNED SINCE THE ISOLATION VALVE IS NOMINALLY
CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
233 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NOMINALLY LEFT OPEN-NO EFFECT WHEN PCS IS OPERATING ON
THE FAILED VALVE/N2 TANKS, CONTINUE UNTIL TANKS ARE EMPTIED THEN
SWITCHOVER TO THE OTHER SYSTEM. NITROGEN CAN BE SHARED AND
PROVIDED TO MMU FROM EITHER N2 SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 234 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/ 1R AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOSS OF ONE VALVE, ONLY HALF OF THE N2 SYSTEM IS AVAILABLE
FOR THE MISSION. POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION. MISSION ABORT,
RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVENTUAL LOSS OF THE NITROGEN SYSTEM. POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE.
MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2-SYSTEM ISOL. VLV (2)
INABILITY TO OPERATE-VALVE IS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
2)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
-
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL/SHORT, MECHANICAL JAM/BREAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MOTOR WILL CAUSE THE VALVE TO REMAIN IN THE OPEN
POSITION. IT IS LIKE MDAC ID 233 (FAILED OPEN). AFFECTED VALVE
CANNOT BE OPERATED MANUALLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
237
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2-SYSTEM ISOL. VLV (2)
INABILITY TO OPERATE - VALVE IS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL/SHORT, MECHANICAL JAM/BREAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN. FAILED CLOSE WOULD PRECLUDE THE SYSTEMS
OF N2. SEE NOTES IN MDAC ID 234 (FAILED CLOSED).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
238
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, DS6&DSI0 (2)
IMPROPER CONTACT, NO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION BINDING/JAMMING, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER POLE INDICATION. TELEMETRY DATA IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DS6&DSI0 (4)
FAILED OPEN, SHORTS, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION. NO EFFECT, NON-ESSENTIAL ITEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERMEDIATE POSITION
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN.
SYSTEMS FROM EACH OTHER.
THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ISOLATING N2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/ IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVES THE VALVE TO CLOSED POSITION AND WILL REMAIN CLOSED. SAME
EFFECTS AS MDAC ID 234.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
242 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(2)
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7& CBI8/N2 SUPPLY ISOL. VLV.
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, PARTS FAILURE,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, EXCEPT FOR LOSS OF OVER-LOAD CIRCUIT PROTECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
243 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(2)
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7& CBI8/N2 SUPPLY ISOL. VLV.
FAILED OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, PARTS FAILURE,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE/SWITCH OPERATION, AND POSITION INDICATION. VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN ITS SET POSITION OPEN. INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE
NITROGEN TANK SYSTEMS FROM EACH OTHER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
244 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR AIORI&AI7RI(5.1K)/N2-SUPPLY ISOL.
FAILED OPEN, SHORT, GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
VLV (2)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
RLR05CSI2GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE VALVE POSITION INDICATION, VALVE POSITION MAY BE
VERIFIED BY N2 FLOW/PRESSURE INDICATION IN THE LINE DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
245
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVI & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
VALVES ARE NOMINALLY OPEN. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE ONE N2
LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-146
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
246
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) _a._IC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY OF ARPCS TO
MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE, WATER TANKS PRESSURE, AND P/L
REQUIREMENT. MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NITROGEN SYSTEM WILL BE DEPLETED AFFECTING OTHER OPERATIONS IF NO
ACTION IS TAKEN. THE NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVES MUST BE CLOSED TO
ISOLATE THE LEAK AND PREVENT POSSIBLE OVER PRESSURE IN VALVE
COMPARTMENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
248 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
INABILITY TO OPERATE, VALVE LEFT CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, SHORT, MECHANICAL, JAM/BREAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE CAN ONLY FAIL CLOSE DURING PRELAUNCH SYSTEM CHECKOUT.
FOR OTHER PHASES OF THE MISSION THE VALVE IS NOMINALLY IN THE
OPEN POSITION AND THE FAILURE MODE IS NOT APPLICABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
249 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
INABILITY TO OPERATE, VALVE LEFT OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, SHORT, MECHANICAL, JAM/BREAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MOTOR ACTION WILL KEEP THE VALVE IN ITS ORIGINAL
POSITION, OPEN IN THIS CASE. NO EFFECT, EXCEPT FOR INABILITY TO
ISOLATE THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
250
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, DS7 & DSII (2)
NO CONTACT (CLOSE OR OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL, N2 SUPPLY REG.
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, BINDING, JAMMING, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE POSITION INDICATOR DOES NOT OPERATE. SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT
AFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
251
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DS7 & DSII (4)
OPEN, SHORTS, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 SUPPLY PANEL, N2 SUPPLY REG.
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
JANTXVIN 4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION NO EFFECT, NON-ESSENTIAL ITEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 252 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, S14 & S22/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: NO CONTACT, VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7205
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS VALVE FAILED OPEN, MDAC ID 245.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
253 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, S14 & S22/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
NO CONTACT, VALVE CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS VALVE FAILED CLOSED, MDAC ID 246.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
254 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB2 I/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _IC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM IS OPERATIONAL BUT WITHOUT CIRCUIT OVERLOAD PROTECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
255 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB21/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE WILL NOT OPERATE. HOWEVER, VALVE WILL BE LEFT IN ITS
NOMINALLY OPEN POSITION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i2/02/86 C-lS6 _-_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
256 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
LATCH (2)
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, AI8RI & AIIRI (5.1K)/REG. INLET VALVE
FAILED OPEN, SHORT, GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: RLROSCSI2GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE POSITION INDICATOR DOES NOT OPERATE. SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT
AFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
257 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKEAGE
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
FAILED OPEN, 2ND STAGE REGULATOR, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH MISSION WILL BE DELAYED WITH LOSS OF REGULATION
CONTROL. THROUGH THE OTHER PHASES OF THE MISSION (EXCEPT L&S),
THE NITROGEN SYSTEM WILL BE DEPLETED THROUGH THE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVEAND VENT SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 258 ABORT:
ITEM: NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED, FIRST OR SECOND STAGE REG.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH MISSION WILL BE DELAYED WITH LOSS OF REGULATION
CONTROL. FOR OTHER PHASES OF THE MISSION (EXCEPT L&S) THE
NITROGEN SYSTEM IS INOPERABLE THUS PREVENTING CABIN PRESSURE,
WATER AND FES SYSTEM OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 259 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH MISSION WILL BE DELAYED WITH LOSS OF REGULATION
CONTROL. FOR OTHER PHASES OF THE MISSION (EXCEPT L&S) THE
NITROGEN SYSTEM WILL BE DEPLETED. THUS IMPAIRING AND EVENTUALLY
PREVENTING CABIN PRESSURE, FES, AND WATER SYSTEMS OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-160
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
260
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
FAILED OPEN, IST STAGE REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
•LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESPONSE AND CONTROL WILL NOT BE ACCURATE BUT SECOND STAGE WILL
PERFORM REGULATOR CONTROL. ASSUMES 2ND STAGE HOLDS 3000 PSIG
PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
261
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-FUSELAGE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME EFFECTS AS MDAC ID 257 (FAILED OPEN). IN ADDITION, THIS
FAILURE IS HARDER TO DETECT SINCE REGULATOR VALVE IS CONTROLLING
THE SYSTEM TO 200 PSIG AND THERE ARE NO OTHER INDICATORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
262
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MID-FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
c[p]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE,
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT HIGH PRESSURE NITROGEN LINE WHEN
NEEDED. POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM. LOSS OF ONE
REDUNDANT LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES & FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSY.
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/I
i/i
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE AND MID-FUSELAGE
V070-634465
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I) IF THE LEAK IS BETWEEN THE TANK AND THE N2 SUPPLY VALVE, THE
LEAK CAN BE ISOLATED AND THE REMAINING N2 SUPPLY CAN BE USED TO
RETURN. 2) IF THE LEAK IS BETWEEN THE N2 SUPPLY VALVE AND THE
SHUTOFF VALVE TO THE REGULATOR, THE SYSTEM IS NOT REDUNDANT AND
N2 WILL BE DEPLETED UNTIL THE SYSTEMS ARE NOT OPERABLE. 3) IF THE
LEAK IS AT THE TEST PORTS OR DOWNSTREAM FROM THE REGULATOR VALVE,
THE LEAK CAN BE ISOLATED AND THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM USED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-164
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
264 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER/CHECK VALVE, AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAJOR EFFECT, POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF ITEMS DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 265 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FILTER/CHECK VALVE AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED, CHECK VALVE FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
CABIN PRESSURE. MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 266 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FILTER/CHECK VALVE AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCONTROLLED N2 INTO A CABIN FLOOR COMPARTMENT CAUSING OVER
PRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT, POTENTIAL RUPTURE AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE. ALSO DEPLETION OF N2 NEEDED FOR PRESSURE MAINTENANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW SENSOR (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (INCLUDING FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) N2/O2 SUPPLY PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
3/2R TAL: 3/2R
3/2R AOA: 3/2R
3/2R ATO: 3/2R
3/3
A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART
FAILURE, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO READILY DETECT FLOW. LOSS OF FUNCTION PRECLUDES
DETERMINATION OF NITROGEN USE STATUS, THUS RISKING
OVERCONSUMPTION. THE IMPACT OF THIS FAILURE DURING AN ABORT IS
MOOT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT INSTRUMENTATION WILL RESULT IN A
GREATER DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY TO CONTINUE THE MISSION, ABORT
DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-168
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME449-0177-6103
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DETECT N2 PRESSURE AFTER N2 REGULATOR. NOT MISSION
OR SAFETY CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2) (PNL M010W)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
FAILURE
SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE PAYLOAD FROM
N2 SYSTEM OVERPRESSURIZATION. PAYLOAD DEFINES THE
USAGE/REQUIREMENTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
270
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
FAILURE
SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DELIVER N2 TO PAYLOAD. MISSION IMPACT IF PAYLOAD
REQUIRES N2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2, UNREGULATED FLOW OF N2 INTO CABIN. THE AFFECTED LEG
MUST BE ISOLATED. EVENTUAL DEPLETION OF NITROGEN. POTENTIAL LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE.
MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 FLOW TO P/L WHEN REQUIRED, SEE ALSO MDAC ID 270.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN IN USE (P/L REQUIREMENT), WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF P/L AND
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT, LEADING TO LOSS OF N2
CONSUMABLE, LOSS OF CAPABILTY TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 274 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, NOT MISSION SAFETY CRITICAL. SYSTEM CAN BE CONTROLLED
THROUGH OTHER VALVES. REDUCES OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
275 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE NOMINALLY CLOSED. REDUCES OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
276 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 2 RT LS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED N2 INTO THE CABIN. DEPLETION OF N2. POTENTIAL
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN
PRESSURE. MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
277 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, VALVE NOMINALLY OPEN. REDUCES OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
TO ISOLATE N2 LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
278 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUPPLY AND WASTE WATER TANK PRESSURE. DIFFICULT TO
OPERATE FES AND WATER DUMP ON-ORBIT. ON RETURN, USE CABIN VOLUME
FOR FES OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
279 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SiP]
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
311R
311R
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED N2 INTO THE CABIN. POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS DEPLETED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. RETURN ON REDUNDANT LEG OR CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29186
ARPCS
280
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH PRESSURE N2 WILL CAUSE RELIEF VALVE TO VENT N2 INTO THE
CABIN CONTINUOUSLY. IN TURN, THE CABIN WILL VENT EXCESS PRESSURE.
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS DEPLETED DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. REGULATOR AND RELIEF
VALVES CAN BE ISOLATED WITH INLET SOV AND SYSTEM CAN OPERATE ON
REDUNDANT LEG OR MANUALLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
281 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
312R
312R
312R
312R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SUPPLY AND WASTE WATER TANK PRESSURE. DIFFICULT TO
OPERATE FES AND WATER DUMP ON-ORBIT. ON RETURN, USE CABIN VOLUME
FOR FES OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
282 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL .PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
B [ P ] c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED N2 INTO THE CABIN. POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS DEPLETED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. RETURN ON REDUNDANT LEG OR CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-183
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 283
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 TANK PRESSURIZATION. CABIN WILL VENT EXCESS
PRESSURE, POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS DEPLETED DUE
TO THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. RELIEF VALVE CAN BE
ISOLATED WITH INLET SOV AND SYSTEM CAN BE OPERATED ON REDUNDANT
LEG OR MANUALLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 284 ABORT:
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSE
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
3/ZR
3/1R
c[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NOMINALLY CLOSED, NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ABILITY TO RELIEVE
HIGH PRESSURE IN THE LINE WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE WATER BLADDER
RUPTURE ANDBACK FLOW INTO FUEL CELL, ETC., CRITICAL CONDITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i0/29186
ARPCS
285
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME449-0177-2901
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL
FAILURE, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DETECT PRESSURE OF REGULATED N2 IN H20 TANKS
PRESSURIZATION LINE. NO OTHER EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-186
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
286 ABORT:
HDW/I_JNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS MDAC ID 277. NO EFFECT, VALVE IS NOMINALLY OPEN.
REDUCES OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO ISOLATE N2 LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
287
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
312R
312R
312R
312R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG TO PRESSURIZE THE H20 TANKS.
PRESSURE AND THE OTHER N2 LEG ARE AVAILABLE.
CABIN
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
288 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE-REGULATOR OUTLET
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/ IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/ZR
C[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION CORROSION CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SAME EFFECT AS MDAC ID 283.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 289 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS : l/1
LI FTOFF: l/1 TAL: l/1
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
N2 SUPPLY VENTED TO THE CABIN THROUGH THIS VALVE. CABIN WILL
VENT EXCESS PRESSURE, POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS
DEPLETED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 290 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PRESSURIZE THE H20 SUPPLY TANKS FROM CABIN
ATMOSPHERE. TOTAL LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
WATER FOR FES OPERATION CRITICAL DURING ASCENT ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
291 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO OPEN
SWITCH, $28 (I)
FAILURE TO TRANSFER, INADVERTANTLY CLOSES, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/21 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: VIBRATION SHOCK CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCHING FUNCTION TO USE CABIN ATMOSPHERE IN ORDER TO
PRESSURIZE THE WATER TANKS. SAME AS MDAC ID 290.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-192
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 292 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I
ITEM: SWITCH, $28 (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILURE TO TRANSFER, PREMATURE OPERATION
INADVERTANTLY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
c C ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION SHOCK CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS MDAC ID 289.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
293 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI5 (i)
FAILED OPEN (INADVERTANTLY OPENS)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO OPEN THE TANK SOLENOID VALVE. SAME AS H20
ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE FAILED CLOSED, MDAC ID 290.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
294 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI5 (I)
FAILED CLOSED (INADVERTANTLY CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OVERLOAD CIRCUIT PROTECTION. OTHERWISE, NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
295 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, A3R3,5.1K (I)
SHORTS, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: RLR05CS12GR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SWITCH POSITION INDICATION ($28).
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-196
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
296 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ARPCS
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PRESSURIZE H20 TANKS FROM CABIN
PRESSURIZATION. SAME AS H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE FAILED
CLOSED, MDAC ID 290.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
297 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6.)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OXYGEN FLOW INTO THE CABIN, RESULTING IN NITROGEN RICH
CABIN. OXYGEN FROM LEH #5 FLOWING CONTINUOUSLY, BUT NOT ADEQUATE
FOR NOMINAL ACTIVITY. LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG BY ISOLATING THE
LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
298 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE PPO2 IN CABIN RESULTING IN 02 RICH CABIN-
FIRE HAZARD. LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-199
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVl&LV2 (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOW OF UNREGULATED N2 INTO THE COMPARTMENT AREA CAUSING
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. POTENTIAL
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE AFTER N2 IS DEPLETED, DUE TO THE INABILITY
TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATOR/N2/02 CONTROLLER VALVE
FULL OPEN/FULL CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF INDICATION CAN BE MADE UP WITH CHECKS ON
PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS, FLOWS (02/N2) AND OTHER INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED-VALVE IS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, ELECTRICAL, PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEE MDAC ID 298.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN-VALVE IS OPEN
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION CONTAMINATION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEE MDAC ID 297.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)
FAILED AUTO-VALVE OPERATES
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION CONTAMINATION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, EXCEPT INABILITY TO CLOSE/OPEN VALVE MANUALLY IF
REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-204
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
304 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K/O2/N2 VALVE SWITCH (5)
SHORTS, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
RLR05C512GR
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SWITCH POSITION INDICATION (S16, 17, 19).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH SI7/PP02 SENSOR A&B (I)
FAILS ON NORMAL OR REVERSE (CONDUCTS SIGNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOOSE THE FLEXIBILITY TO SWITCH CONTROLLERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH SIT/PPO2 SENSOR A&B (i)
FAILS TO CONDUCT (ANY POSITION-NO SIGNAL)
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) _c
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL-PANEL L2
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOOSE THE ABILITY TO OPERATE O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE IN AUTO MODE.
NO SIGNAL FROM PPO2 - MANUAL OPERATION AND CREW INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
O2/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE HIGH (SENSES HIGH PP02).
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PART PIECE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROLLER SIGNAL OR CONTINUOUS HIGH SIGNAL WILL KEEP THE
O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE OPEN (FLOWING N2). OPERATION CAN BE SWITCHED
TO THE REDUNDANT CONTROLLER. ULTIMATELY MANUAL OPERATION CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH PPO2 SENSOR C. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES
WILL ABORT THE MISSION WITH CREW IN LEH AND PCS CONFIGURED TO
FLOW N2 TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-208
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
OUT OF TOLERANCE LOW (SENSES LOW PP02)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PART PIECE
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLLER OUT OF TOLERANCE HIGH WILL EVENTUALLY CREATE IN 02
RICH ENVIRONMENT THEREFORE CREATING A FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-209
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
O2/N2 CONTROLLER (2)
INABILITY TO OPERATE (NO SIGNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROLLER SIGNAL WILL PREVENT 28V POWER TO SOLENOID,
HENCE VALVE WILL BE IN CLOSED POSITION. LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG-
ABORT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/XR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PPO2 SENSORS A+B (2)
FAILS TO SENSE (ZERO OUTPUT SIGNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0060
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT SIGNAL WILL CAUSE THE CONTROLLER TO CLOSE THE O2/N2
CONTROL VALVE, THUS EVENTUALLY CREATING AN 02 RICH CABIN AND A
FIRED HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PPO2 SENSORS A+B (2)
FULL OUTPUT SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0060
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
5V OUTPUT SIGNAL WILL CAUSE THE CONTROLLER TO OPEN THE O2/N2
CONTROL VALVE AND FLOW REGULATED N2 TO THE CABIN. LEH'S IS
CONTINUOUSLY FLOWING 02, THUS MAINTAINING CREW METABOLIC
REQUIREMENTS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT LEG-ABORT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
312
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PP02 SENSOR-C (i)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0060
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BASED ON ITS USEAGE FOR VOTING PURPOSES ON THE OTHER TWO SENSORS,
THE LOSS OF THIS SENSOR ASSUMES MALFUNCTION WITH SENSORS A&B.
THEREFORE, LOSS OF ABILITY TO DETECT PPO2 LEVEL IN THE CABIN.
PPO2 MEASUREMENT IS CRITICAL FOR DETECTING HIGH (FIRE HAZARD),
OR LOW (CREW CURVIVAL) OXYGEN LEVEL IN THE CABIN, AND ALSO FOR
OPERATION OF THE P2/N2 VALVE IN "AUTO" MODE (CREW CONVENIENCE).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
313
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, PP02 CONTROLLER (2)
FAILED IN "NORMAL" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SWITCH TO EMERGENCY PPO2 LEVEL. HOWEVER,
IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS (E.G., CABIN LEAK). THE ARPCS WILL BE
CONFIGURED TO FLOW N2 ONLY REGARDLESS OF PPO2 LEVEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-214
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, PPO2 CONTROLLER (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED IN "EMERGENCY" POSITION, OR NORMAL
POSITION W/NO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY REGULATE PPO2 TO NORMAL (3.2
PSIA) LEVEL. HOWEVER APRCS CAN BE MAINTAINED MANUALLY. CREW
INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTORS/10K (2)
FAILED OPEN, SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION,
ANY CONTACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PPO2 CONTROLLER SWITCH INDICATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
316
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI8&CBI9 (2)
FAILED CLOSED (CONDUCTING)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OVERLOAD CIRCUIT PROTECTION, OTHERWISE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB18&CB19 (2)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
_)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO PP02 CONTROLLER SWITCH, PPO2 SENSOR, O2/N2
CONTROLLER, 02 FLOW SENSOR, AND N2 FLOW SENSOR ON THE AFFECTED
LEG. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL INHIBIT OPERATION OF O2/N2 CONTROL
VALVES. POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE. MISSION ABORT, RETURN ON CABIN VOLUME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-218
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o129186
ARPCS
318
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, S6/PPO2 SELECTOR (i)
FAILED IN ONE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - LOSS OF METER-READING OF PPO2 SENSORS.
DISPLAYS ARE AVAILABLE WITH PP02 MEASUREMENTS.
PASS/BFS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, M4/PPO2 READING (1)
ANY FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0238
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF METER READING OF PPO2 LEVEL-DATA AVAILABLE FROM PASS/BFS
DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-220
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
320 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $5/02/N2 FLOW SELECTOR (i)
FAILED IN ANY POSITION, OR FAILURE TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0093-5025
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF METER READING OF REDUNDANT O2/N2 FLOW-DATA AVAILABLE FROM
PASS/BFS DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
321
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, M3/O2/N2 FLOW READING (i)
ANY FAILURE (OUT OF TOLERANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0238
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF METER READING OF ANY 02/N2 FLOW SENSORS-DATA AVAILABLE
FROM PASS/BFS DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (1)
OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHOUT CABIN PRESSURE INDICATION, PRESSURE LEVELS CANNOT BE SET
OR VERIFIED. ALTERNATE MEANS OF PRESSURE INDICATION CAN BE MADE
THROUGH THE AIRLOCK METER, AND OTHERS SUCH AS THE PPO2 SENSOR AND
DP/DT SENSOR. MOST CRITICAL FOR EVA MISSIONS
AND 10.2 PSIA MANUAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
323
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, M4/CABIN PRESSURE READING (I)
ANY FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0238
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF METER READING OF CABIN PRESSURE.
THE COMPUTERS.
DATA AVAILABLE THROUGH
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-224
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
324 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT)
CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (i)
FAILS TO SENSE, OUT OF TOLERANCE (FULL/ZERO
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CABIN RATE OF CHANGE OF PRESSURE MAY BE ALSO DETECTED BY CABIN P,
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD DP GAGE, AND C&W KLAXON IF DP/DT > .05. CREW
INCONVENIENCE TO MONITOR CHANGE OF PRESSURE OVER LONG PERIOD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: METER, M3/DP/DT READING (i)
FAILURE MODE: ANY FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC432-0238
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DP/DT MEASUREMENT IS AVAILABLE ON PASS AND BFS DISPLAYS - NO
EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
326 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (i)
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT OVERLOAD PROTECTION - NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (i)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) O2/N2 CNTRL PANEL
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO DP/DT SENSOR, PPO2-C SENSOR, AND C&W KLAXON.
THE DP/DT AND PPO2-C ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL FOR MISSION
COMPLETION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 328 ABORT:
ITEM: KLAXON/DP/DT (i)
FAILURE MODE: ANY CREDIBLE FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AMC
N2 ASSEMBLY
02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUDIBLE C&W SOUND ALERTING CREW TO HIGH DP/DT. NOT
ESSENTIAL, SINCE ON-BOARD METER, AND PASS/BFS DISPLAYS WILL
PROVIDE FOR MONITORING OF DP/DT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
329
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES & FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) N2 ASSEMBLY
4) 02/N2 CNTRL PANEL
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
211R
211R
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V070-613130
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF 02 AND N2 FROM THE AFFECTED LEG. OVERPRESSURIZATION OF
THE COMPARTMENT AREA FROM UNREGULATED 02 OR N2. LOSS OF ONE
REDUNDANT LEG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
330
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002-0050
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE CREW CABIN FROM THE VENT LINE. NO
EFFECT SINCE IT IS NOMINALLY OPEN, HOWEVER, IT IS ONE-STEP FROM
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE (I.E.-RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129186
ARPCS
331
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)
FAILED CLOSED, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002-0050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT HIGH PRESSURE CABIN IF NEEDED. LOSS
OF REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN CREATING POTENTIAL CONDITION FOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE-POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. DURING ON-
ORBIT, THE CABIN CAN BE VENTED THROUGH AIRLOCK EQUALIZATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-232
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
332 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOTOR/ISOLATION VALVE (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, (VALVE IN OPEN POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE CREW CABIN FROM THE VENT LINE.
NOMINALLY VALVE IS OPEN, AND WILL REMAIN OPEN WITHOUT POWER, SEE
MDAC ID 330.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129/86
ARPCS
333
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOTOR/ISOLATION VALVE (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT (VALVE IN CLOSED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS CHECKED OUT PRELAUNCH, AND REMAINS OPEN THROUGHOUT
MISSION. THERE IS NO MANUAL OVERRIDE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-234
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
334 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPEN OR CLOSED)
POSITION INDICATION, DSI, DS2 (2)
ANY CREDIBLE FAILURE, (SHORT, OPEN, CONTINUOUSLY
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL, PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION, NO OTHER EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
335
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, Sl&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)
FAILED ENABLED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCHING ACTION TO CLOSED POSITION; HOWEVER VALVE IS TO
REMAIN IN "OPEN" POSITION THROUGHOUT MISSION. ONE FAILURE AWAY
FROM LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-236
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
336
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APPLICABLE ONLY DURING PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT-NO CREW ACTION IS
ASSIGNED TO SWITCH TO CLOSED POSITION DURING MISSION; I.E.,
SWITCH SHOULD BE IN "ENABLE" POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/29/86
ARPCS
337
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)
PREMATURELY CLOSES (INADVERTENTLY CLOSES)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT CABIN, SAME AS MDAC ID 331.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
338 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7&CB22 (2)
FAILED OPEN, DOES NOT CONDUCT, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE SWITCH, POSITION
INDICATION, AND MOTOR. VALVE WILL GO/REMAIN IN OPEN POSITION.
ONE STEP AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
339
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7&CB22 (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT, EXCEPT LOSS OF CIRCUIT OVERLOAD
PROTECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
340
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, AIR1 & A2RI, 5.1K (2)
ANY FAILURE (OPEN, SHORT, ANY CONTACT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION, NON-ESSENTIAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
341
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DSI & DS2 (4)
FAILED OPEN, SHORTS, OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.
ITEM.
NO EFFECT, NON-ESSENTIAL
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
342 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0050
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
C[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. THE CREW WILL CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE TO INHIBIT
THE FLOW OUT OF THE CABIN AND SUBSEQUENT POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
OPERATION IS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2)
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/2R RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0050
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VENTING FUNCTION WHEN NEEDED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
c[p]
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEE MDAC ID 343, RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FILTER (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) POSITIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER (1)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CLOGGED FILTER WILL PREVENT ADEQUATE CABIN PRESSURE CHECKOUT
DURING PRE-LAUNCH OPERATION. SYSTEM IS INOPERATIVE DURING REST
OF MISSION (NOT USED), THEREFORE FAILURE IS N/A.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
347
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER (I)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 348 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0090
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/IR
2/IR
211R
c[P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE IN A SHORT PERIOD IF BOTH VALVES FAILED
OPEN. NO CABIN COOLING, CREW DEPRIVED OF 02, NO PRESSURIZATION-
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC250-0002-0090
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ADEQUATE PRELAUNCH PROCEDURE TO VERIFY CABIN PRESSURE
CHECKOUT - OTHERWISE, THE VALVES ARE INOPERATIVE DURING MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-250
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
350
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ADEQUATE PRELAUNCH PROCEDURE TO VERIFY CABIN PRESSURE
CHECKOUT - LAUNCH DELAY..
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
351 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $3 & $4
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE THE CREW CABIN FROM VENT LINE DURING
PRE-LAUNCH CABIN PRESSURE CHECKOUT. SWITCH IS INOPERATIVE
THROUGHOUT THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-252
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
352 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $3 & $4
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PERFORM CABIN PRESSURE CHECKOUT DURING PRELAUNCH -
LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-253 _.... _f
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $3 & $4
FAILED IN THE CENTER POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS FAILED CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-254
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
354 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, $3 & $4
DOES NOT CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAME AS FAILED CLOSED, MDAC ID 352.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARPCS FLIGHT: 3/3
355 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, DS3, DS4 (2)
ANY FAILURE (FULL OPEN, FULL CLOSE, NO CONTACT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
MC432-0222-0029
CAUSES: SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, VALVES ARE CHECKED OUT PRE-LAUNCH.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
ARPCS
356
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, A3RI, A4RI, 5.1K (2)
ANY FAILURE (OPEN, SHORT)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORB IT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
357
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, DS3 &DS4 (4)
OPEN SHORTS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.
ITEM.
NO EFFECT, NON-ESSENTIAL
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-258
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
358 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POSSIBLE CIRCUIT OVERLOAD PROTECTION.
DISABLING CABIN VENT THROUGHOUT THE MISSION.
INADVERTANT OPERATION OF THE SWITCHES.
ALSO LOSS OF
HIGHER RISK OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) CABIN VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: / NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM THE CABIN PRESSURE CHECKOUT DURING
PRELAUNCH. OTHERWISE THE CB'S ARE INTENTIONALLY PULLED THROUGH
THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-260
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
360
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEADANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE, BELOW HATCH
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002-0075
c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN IN USE (CABIN PRESSURE LOWER THAN AMBIENT PRESSURE) IT WILL
ALLOW FLOW TO THE CABIN BY POPPING THE CAP SEALS. ONCE THE LINE
IS OPEN, AND THE AMBIENT PRESSURE DECAYS TO VACUUM, IT WILL
DEPRESSURIZE THE CABIN COMPLETELY RESULTING IN NO CABIN
PRESSURE, COOLING, AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
ARPCS
361
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE (2)
FAILED CLOSED, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE, BELOW HATCH
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002-0075
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SAFEGUARD CREW CABIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
AGAINST HIGH NEGATIVE DP. NO EFFECT DURING ON-ORBIT, SINCE HIGH
CABIN PRESSURE WILL ALSO SEAL THE LINE (CAP) CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
362 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP (2)
INABILITY TO POP
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE, BELOW HATCH
MC250-0002-0075
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ENSURE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH HIGH
NEGATIVE DP DURING ASCENT/ENTRY. SAME AS VALVE FAILED CLOSED
MDAC ID 361.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
363 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP (2)
INABILITY TO MATE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE, BELOW HATCH
MC250-0002-0075
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NEGATIVE RELIEF VALVE IS ADEQUATE TO PREVENT FLOW AT POSITIVE
DP CONDITIONS-CAPS ARE REDUNDANT SEALS, AND NOT ESSENTIAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEBRIS SCREEN (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY /T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT PLENUM, BELOW HATCH
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SAFE-GUARD AGAINST HIGH NEGATIVE DP DURING
ASCENT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
365 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEBRIS SCREEN (2)
FAILED OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) NEGATIVE RELIEF VENT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT PLENUM, BELOW HATCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES : SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - IT IS PRIMARILY USED TO KEEP CONTAMINANTS OUT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-266
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARPCS FLIGHT:
366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE (2)
FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WITH S/L)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY / T. MCLAUGHLIN
SAIIDI
SUBSYS LEAD: M.
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ARPCS
2) AMC
3) 02 ASSY
4) O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEE MDAC ID 193 (FAILED OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, WITHOUT S/L).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-267
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